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Abstract
This paper studies the theoretical properties of a channel system of interest-
rate control in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Agents are subject to
liquidity shocks which can be partially insured in a secured money market, or
at a standing facility operated by the central bank. We show that it is optimal
to have a strictly positive interest rate corridor and that a shift of the corridor
aﬀects the money market rate one for one. Moreover, the central bank can
tighten its policy without changing its policy rate by simply increasing the
corridor symmetrically around the policy rate.
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1 Introduction
Channel systems are becoming increasingly popular. Several central banks now im-
plement monetary policy using a channel system and others are using at least some
features of the channel system.1 Despite its popularity, the consequences of imple-
menting monetary policy with a channel system are not well understood. How does
implementation of monetary policy in a channel system diﬀer from plain-vanilla open
market operations? What is the welfare maximizing policy? The purpose of this
paper is to study the theoretical properties of a channel system.
In a channel system a central bank oﬀers two standing facilities: a lending facility
where it is ready to supply money overnight at a given lending rate against collateral
and a deposit facility where banks can make overnight deposits to earn a deposit
rate. The interest-rate corridor - defined by the diﬀerence between the lending and
the deposit rates - is chosen to keep the overnight interest rate in the money market
close to the target rate. In a pure channel system a change in policy is implemented
by simply shifting the corridor without any open market operations.
There are several stylized facts of channel systems that a reasonable theoretical
model has to explain. First, all central banks set a strictly positive corridor. Second,
central banks typically react to changing economic conditions by shifting the interest-
rate corridor. Third, the money market rate tends to be in the middle of the corridor.
We construct a general equilibrium model that is able to explain these stylized facts.
1For example, versions of a channel system are operated by the Bank of Canada, the European
Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The US Federal
Reserve System recently modified the operating procedures of its discount window facility in a way
that it now shares elements of a standing facility. Prior to 2003, the discount window rate was set
below the target federal fund rate, but banks faced penalties when accessing the discount window. In
2003 the Federal Reserve decided to set the discount window rate 100 basis points above the target
federal fund rate and eased access conditions to the discount window. The resulting framework is
similar to a channel system, where the deposit rate is zero and the lending rate 100 basis point above
the target rate.
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Moreover, we shed some light on the following questions. First, why do central
banks choose diﬀerent corridors? Most central banks choose a corridor of 50 basis
points (e.g. Australia, Canada and New Zealand), while the European Central Bank’s
(ECB) lending rate is 200 basis points higher than its deposit rate (Figure 1).2 Second,
why can some central banks control the overnight interest rate very tightly while
others cannot? For instance, the overnight interbank cash rate in New Zealand is
almost always on the policy rate set by the Reserve Bank (Figure 2). In contrast, the
Euro overnight rate fluctuates considerably around the target rate set by the ECB.
Figure 1:  EONIA - Euro OverNight Index Average
and Eurepo - reference rate for the Euro GC repo market
Source: European Banking Federation and ECB
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To study the previous observations we construct a dynamic general equilibrium
model of a channel system with a money market and a welfare optimizing central
bank. Agents are subject to idiosyncratic trading shocks which generate random
liquidity needs.3 These shocks can be partially insured in a secured money market.
2As can be seen from Figure 1, the ECB increased its spread dramatically from 50 basis points
to 250 basis points around February 1999 before reducing it to 200 basis points around April 1999.
3We abstract from modelling commercial banks explicitly. Rather, we assume that households
3
To provide further insurance the central bank operates a standing facility where agents
can borrow or deposit money at the specified rates. In accordance with central bank
practice, there is no limit to the size of deposits on which interest is paid. There is
also no limit to the size of a loan that an agent can obtain provided that the loan is
fully collateralized. Within this framework we answer the following three questions.
First, what is the welfare maximizing interest-rate corridor? Second, what is the
optimal collateral policy? Third, how does changing the corridor aﬀect the money
market rate?
Figure 2: Overnight Interbank Cash Rate
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand
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The following results emerge from our model. We show that it is optimal to have
a positive wedge between the borrowing rate and the deposit rate if the opportunity
cost of holding collateral is positive.4 The optimal corridor is decreasing in the rate
of return of the collateral and equal to zero when the opportunity cost of acquiring
have direct access to the money market and the central bank’s lending and deposit facility. The
trading shocks are an approximation for liquidity shocks faced by commercial banks after trading in
the money market. Since there is no trading of reserves feasible after this market has closed, banks
who need liquidity have no choice but to use the standing facility oﬀered by the central bank.
4The rate of return of the collateral determines the opportunity costs for commercial banks of
accessing the lending facility of the central bank where a high rate of return implies a small or zero
4
collateral is zero. We also show that a central bank has two equivalent options to
implement a given policy: it can either shift the corridor while keeping the corridor
constant, or it can change the corridor. For instance, it can keep the deposit rate
constant and increase the borrowing rate. In particular, it can set a zero deposit rate
and only modify the lending rate as it is done for example by the US Federal Reserve
System.
An interesting aspect of the channel system is that a central bank can tighten
its policy without changing its target rate. The reason is that by increasing the
corridor symmetrically around the target rate the central bank worsens the option for
banks of accessing the standing facility. As a result the policy regime is tighter. This
result indicates that the ECB with its 200 basis points corridor implements a tighter
monetary policy than the other central banks operating a channel system mentioned
before. This property of the channel system might explain why countries with the
same target rate but diﬀerent corridors perform diﬀerently.
We also find that the money market rate tends to be above the target rate if
the opportunity cost of holding collateral are positive or/and if there is too little
liquidity. This property of the model provides an answer to the ECB’s concern about
the fact that the Euro overnight rate tends to be above the target rate (Figure 1).
Our model thus suggests that in the channel system operated by the ECB either
holding collateral is too costly or liquidity is scarce.
Literature There are very few theoretical studies related to our paper and all of
them are partial equilibrium models. An early contribution is the model of banks
reserve management under uncertainty by Poole (1968). Woodford (2000, 2001) dis-
cusses and analyses the channel system to address the question of how to conduct
monetary policy in a world with a vanishing stock of money. Whitsell (2006) evalu-
ates reserves regimes versus channel systems. Elements of channel systems have been
opportunity cost. Assets accepted as collateral are typically low-risk and low-yield assets such as
government securities.
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previously described in Gaspar, Quiros and Mendizabal (2004), Guthrie and Wright
(2000), and Heller and Lengwiler (2003). These studies are complementary to our
approach. We consider a general equilibrium model where a positive liquidity shock
for one bank corresponds to a negative liquidity shock for another bank. The cost of
pledging collateral is explicit and money is essential.5 Finally, we conduct a welfare
analysis and derive the welfare maximizing interest-rate corridor.
The main reason why there is no other general equilibrium analysis is that money
growth is endogenous in a channel system. In contrast, most theoretical models of
monetary policy characterize optimal policy in terms of a path for the money supply.
In practice, however, monetary policy involves rules for setting nominal interest rates
and most central banks specify operating targets for overnight interest rates. This
paper therefore is an attempt to break the apparent dichotomy (Goodhard, 1989)
between theoretical analysis and central bank practices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. The
equilibrium without money market and the optimal monetary policy is characterized
in Section 3. The equilibrium with the money market is characterized in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs and a description of the Euro money markets and the
ECB’s operating procedures can be found in the Appendix.
5By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota 1998
and Wallace 2001).
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2 Environment
We construct a dynamic general equilibriummodel with a [0,1]-continuum of infinitively-
lived agents and a central bank. Time is discrete and in each period three perfectly
competitive markets open sequentially.6 The first market is the settlement market
where all agents produce and consume a general good and settle their claims from the
previous period. The second market is the money market where agents can borrow
and lend cash at the market rate and in the third market agents either produce or
consume a perishable good.
 
t  1t +  
Settlement Market 
Produce and consume 
Idio. Shock     
,m b  
Money Market 
interest  rate im  
Signal 
Goods Market 
Produce or consume 
 
Standing Facility 
deposit rate id  
lending rate il
Figure 3: Sequence of markets.
General goods in the first market are produced solely from inputs of labor ac-
cording to a constant return to scale production technology where one unit of the
consumption good is produced with one unit of labor generating one unit of disutility.
Thus, producing h units of the general good implies disutility −h, while consuming
h units gives utility h.7
At the beginning of the third market, agents receive idiosyncratic preference and
technology shocks which determine whether they consume or produce in this market.
With probability 1−n an agent can consume and cannot produce. We refer to these
agents as buyers. With probability n, an agent can produce and cannot consume.
These are sellers. Agents get utility u(q) from q consumption in the second market,
6The sequence of markets is motivated by the ECB’s operating procedures. In the Appendix we
describe the functioning of the Euro money markets and the ECB’s operating procedures.
7The environment shares elements of Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005) (credit market),
Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2006) (settlement) and Lagos and Wright (2005) (degenerate
distribution of money holdings).
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where u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞ and u0(∞) = 0. Producers incur a utility
cost c(q) = q from producing q units of output. All trades are anonymous and
agents’ trading histories are private information. Since sellers require immediate
compensation for their production eﬀort money is essential for trade. The discount
factor is β where for technical reasons we assume that β > n.
Money market At the beginning of the money market, agents receive a signal
about the probability that they will become a consumer or a producer in the third
market. With probability σk an agent receives the information that he will be a
seller with probability nk, k = H,L, where ε ≡ nH − nL ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that
n =
P
k=H,L σ
knk so that there is no aggregate uncertainty. This modelling approach
captures the idea that when the money market is open agents receive information
about their end of day cash holdings. Some agents believe that they are likely to
have excess cash at the end of the day and others that they are likely to be short of
cash. The diﬀerence in expected liquidity needs generate an incentive for trading in
the money market.
There are three cases. When ε = 0 the signal contains no information and so
agents have no gains from trading in the money market. Consequently, no trade
occurs in the money market. We will consider this case in Section 3. If ε = 1 there
is no uncertainty about the liquidity shock in the goods market. Consequently, the
portfolios are completely adjusted in the money market and no agent accesses the
standing facility. Finally, if ε ∈ (0, 1), the signal contains some information about the
future liquidity shock, but the information is not perfect. As a result agents use both
the money market and the standing facility to adjust their portfolio. For example,
some agents will get the information that they will be sellers with high probability
but then turn out to be buyers. These agents will first use the money market to trade
away their cash and then use the standing facility to take out loans. We will consider
this case in Section 4.
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Standing facility We assume that at the beginning of the third market after the
idiosyncratic shocks are observed a central bank oﬀers a borrowing facility and a
deposit facility. It oﬀers nominal loans ` at an interest rate i` and promises to pay
interest rate id on nominal deposits d with i` ≥ id. This condition eliminates the
possibility for arbitrage where agents borrow and subsequently make a deposit at
interest id > i`, thus increasing their money holdings at no cost. The central bank
operates at zero cost.
Since we focus on standing facilities, we restrict financial contracts to overnight
contracts. An agent who borrows ` units of money from the central bank in market
2, repays (1 + i`) ` units of money in market 1 of the following period. Also, an agent
who deposits d units of money at the central bank in market 2 of period t receives
(1 + id) d units of money in market 1 of the following period.
Accordingly, the money stock evolves endogenously as follows
M+1 =M − (1− n)i``+ nidd+ πM, (1)
where M denotes the per capita stock of money at the beginning of period t. In
the first market total loans (1− n)` are repaid. Since interest rate payments by the
agents are (1− n)i``, the stock of money shrinks by this amount. Interest payments
by the central bank on total deposits are nidd. The central bank simply prints addi-
tional money to make these interest payments so the stock of money increases by this
amount. Finally, the central bank can also change the stock of money via lump-sum
transfers T = πM in market 1. However, since central banks cannot tax agents, we
restrict these lump sum transfers to be positive, that is π ≥ 0.8
Default In any model of credit, default is a serious issue. Since production is costly,
those agents who have borrowed in the previous period have an incentive to default
8The lump-sum transfers are a substitute for open-market operations that we do not model here.
However, in pure channel systems central banks do not use open-market operations to aﬀect the
money market rate on a regular basis. Nevertheless, there is no clear reason why we should rule this
possibility out. Later we will show that it is optimal to set π = 0.
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in market 1 of the current period. To prevent default all loans must be secured with
collateral. We assume that the central bank operates the money market and keeps
track of all financial arrangements and collateral holdings. In particular, only the
central bank can verify the existence of collateral. This means that collateral cannot
be used to secure IOU’s in the goods market.
We assume that general goods produced in market 1 can be stored with a constant
return to scale technology that yields R ≥ 1 units of general goods in market 1 of
the following period. We also impose βR ≤ 1 since when βR > 1 agents would store
infinite amounts of goods which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
First-best allocation In the Appendix we show that the expected lifetime utility
of the representative agent for a stationary allocation (q, b) where q is consumption
and b collateral holdings at the beginning of a period is given by
(1− β)W = (1− n) [u(q)− q] + (βR− 1) b (2)
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected utility from consuming and
producing the market 3 good. The second term is the utility of producing collateral
and receiving the return in the following period.
It is obvious that the first-best allocation (q∗, b∗) satisfies q = q∗ where q∗ is the
value of q that solves u0(q) = 1. Moreover, b∗ = 0 if βR < 1 and b∗ is indeterminate
if βR = 1. Thus, a social planner would never choose a positive amount of collateral
when collateral is costly.
3 No trade in the money market
Assume ε = 0. Then there is no trade in the money market and agents only use the
lending and deposit facilities of the central bank to adjust their money holdings. We
now characterize the symmetric stationary equilibrium in this case.
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In period t, let φ ≡ 1/P be the real price of money in market 1. We focus on
symmetric and stationary equilibria where all agents follow identical strategies and
where the real allocation is constant over time. In a stationary equilibrium beginning-
of-period real money balances are time invariant
φM = φ+1M+1. (3)
This implies that φ/φ+1 = P+1/P =M+1/M = γ. Moreover, we restrict our attention
to stationary equilibria where γ is time invariant which eliminates stationary equilibria
where γ is stochastic.
We let V (m, b) denote the expected value from entering market 2 with m units of
money and b collateral. W (m, b, `, d) denotes the expected value of entering the first
market with m units of money, b collateral, ` loans, and d deposits. For notational
simplicity we suppress the dependence of the value function on the time index t.
In what follows we look at a representative period t.
3.1 Settlement
In the first market, the problem of a representative agent is:
W (m, b,`, d) = max
h,m2,b2
−h+ V (m2, b2)
s.t. φm2 + b2 = h+ φm+Rb+ φ(1 + id)d− φ(1 + i`)`+ φπM.
where h is hours worked in market 1. Using the budget constraint to eliminate h in
the objective function, one obtains the first-order conditions9
Vm = φ (4)
Vb ≤ 1 ( = if b > 0 ) (5)
Vm ≡ ∂V (m2,b2)∂m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the
second market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, −φ is the
9We focus on monetary equilibria where (4) holds with equality. In contrast, there are monetary
equilibria where agents do not use the standing facility implying b = 0 because Vb < 1.
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utility cost of acquiring one unit of money in the first market of period t. Vb ≡ ∂V (m2,b2)∂b2
is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the second market in period
t. Since the marginal disutility of working is 1, −1 is the utility cost of acquiring one
unit of collateral in the first market of period t. The implication of (4) and (5) is that
all agents enter the following period with the same amount of money and the same
quantity of collateral (which can be zero). This is the reason why we interpret this
market as a settlement stage. By itself, this market does not increase social welfare.
Rather, it involves a mere transfer of an asset between participants in order to settle
claims from the previous period.
The envelope conditions are
Wm = φ;Wb = R;W` = −φ (1 + i`) ;Wd = φ (1 + id) (6)
where Wj is the partial derivative of W (m, b,`, d) with respect to j = m, b,`, d.
3.2 Liquidity shocks
We immediately proceed to market 3 since when ε = 0 no trade occurs in the money
market. At the beginning of market 3, agents receive idiosyncratic shocks which
determine whether they are consumers or producers. With probability 1−n an agent
becomes a consumer and with probability n a producer. Let q and qs respectively
denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller in market 3. Let
`b (`s) and db (ds) respectively denote the loan obtained and the amount of money
deposited by a buyer (seller) in market 2. An agent who hasm money and b collateral
at the opening of market 3 has expected lifetime utility
V (m, b) = (1− n)[u(q) + βW (m− pq − db + `b, b, `b, db)]
+n[−qs + βW (m+ pqs − ds + `s, b, `s, ds)]
where q, qs, `s, `b, ds and db are chosen optimally as follows.
It is obvious that buyers will never deposit funds in the central bank and sellers
will never take out loans and therefore db = 0 and `s = 0. To simplify notation let
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` = `b and d = ds. Accordingly, we get
V (m, b) = (1− n)[u(q) + βW (m− pq + `, b, `, 0)]
+n [−qs + βW (m+ pqs − d, b, 0, d)]
where qs, q, ` and d solve the following optimization problems.
A seller’s problem ismaxqs,d [−qs + βW (m+ pqs − d, b, 0, d)] s.t. m+pqs−d ≥ 0.10
Using (6), the first-order condition reduces to
pβφ+1 + pβφ+1λd = 1 (7)
id = λd (8)
where βφ+1λd is the multiplier on the deposit constraint. The two conditions can be
combined to get
pβφ+1 (1 + id) = 1. (9)
If an agent is a buyer, he solves the following maximization problem:
max
q,`
u(q) + βW (m− pq + `, b, `, 0)
s.t. pq ≤ m+ ` and ` ≤ ¯`
where
¯`= Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i`)
¤
(10)
is the maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the central bank since b units
of collateral transform into Rb units of real goods at the beginning of the following
period. These goods can be sold for Rb/φ+1 units of money. Finally, the collateral
must also cover the interest payment.
10Here we assume that sellers can deposit their money holdings at the standing facility, including
the proceeds from their latest transaction. This is in line with the institutional details described
in the Appendix that banks can access the standing facility of the ECB 30 minutes after the close
of the money market. The results are not fundamentally aﬀected when agents can only deposit a
fraction or none of their receipts from selling goods.
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Using (6) the buyer’s first-order conditions can be written as
u0(q) = pβφ+1(1 + λq) (11)
λq = λ` + i` (12)
where βφ+1λq is the multiplier of the buyer’s budget constraint and βφ+1λ` the one
of the borrowing constraint. Using (9) and combining (11) and (12) yields
u0(q) =
1 + i` + λ`
1 + id
. (13)
If the borrowing constraint is not binding and the central bank sets i` = id, trades are
eﬃcient. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1 which means trades
are ineﬃcient even when i` = id.
Using the envelope theorem and (11), the marginal value of money in market 3 is
Vm = (1− n)u0(q)/p+ nβφ+1(1 + id). (14)
The marginal value of money has a straightforward interpretation. An agent with an
additional unit of money becomes a buyer with probability 1 − n in which case he
acquires 1/p units of goods yielding additional utility u0(q)/p. With probability n he
becomes a seller in which case he deposits overnight his money yielding the nominal
return 1 + id. Note that the standing facility increases the marginal value of money
because agents can earn interest on idle cash.
3.3 Liquidity premium
Since in equilibrium there is no default the real return of collateral is βR. The real
return is smaller than the marginal value Vb if λ` > 0. To see this, use the envelope
theorem to derive the marginal value of collateral in the second market
Vb = (1− n)λ`βR/ (1 + i`) + βR. (15)
Thus, the diﬀerence between the real return and the marginal value is (1−n)λ`βR/ (1 + i`)
which is positive if collateral relaxes the borrowing constraints of the buyers. It is
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critical for the working of the model that Vb > βR. The reason is that, since βR−1 is
negative, agents are only willing to hold collateral if the liquidity value as expressed
by the shadow price λ` is positive.
To derive the liquidity premium on the collateral use the first-order conditions (5)
and (13) to write (15) as follows:
1− βR = (1− n) [u0(q)βR/∆− βR] . (16)
where∆ ≡ (1+i`)/(1+id). The term βR/∆ is the price of goods in terms of collateral
in market 3. A buyer can use the collateral to borrow Rφ+1(1+i`) units of money which
allows him to acquire R
pφ+1(1+i`)
= βR(1+id)
1+i`
= βR/∆ units of goods.
The right-hand side of equation (16) is the liquidity premium on the collateral.
While collateral costs −1 to produce, its return is βR ≤ 1. Hence, if βR < 1, agents
need an incentive to hold collateral. This is provided by making collateral liquid.
If the return on the collateral increases, then, holding q constant, its liquidity
premium will increase. To satisfy (16) the marginal benefit from an additional unit
of collateral u0(q)/∆ must fall which means that q must increase. In contrast, an
increase in ∆, holding q constant, reduces the liquidity premium since an increase in
∆ increases the cost of acquiring money with collateral. Consequently, to satisfy (16)
the marginal benefit of an additional unit of good must rise and therefore q decreases.
Monetary policy aﬀects the allocation and welfare by its choice of ∆.
3.4 Symmetric stationary equilibrium
To define a symmetric stationary equilibrium use the first-order condition (5) and
(16) to get
1− βR
βR
≥ (1− n) [u0(q)/∆− 1] ( = if b > 0 ). (17)
Then (4), (9), (14), and taking into account that in a stationary equilibriumM+1/M =
φ/φ+1 = γ, yield
γ − β (1 + id)
β (1 + id)
= (1− n) [u0(q)− 1] . (18)
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Also from (1) we get
γ = 1 + id − (1− n)(i` − id)
z`
zm
+ π, (19)
where zm = m/p and z` = `/p. To derive this equation we use d = m + pqs, market
clearing nqs = (1 − n)q and we take into account that in symmetric equilibrium all
agents hold identical amounts of money when they enter market 3. Then, from the
budget constraint of the buyer we have
q = zm + z`. (20)
Finally, since βR < 1 in any equilibrium where agents hold collateral it must be the
case that the borrowing constraint is binding and so from (9) and (10) we get11
z` = βRb/∆. (21)
We can use these five equations to define a symmetric stationary equilibrium. They
determine the endogenous variables (γ, q, z`, zm, b). Note that all other endogenous
variables can be derived from these equilibrium values.
Definition 1 A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a list (γ, q, z`, zm, b) satisfying
(17)-(21) with z` ≥ 0 and zm ≥ 0.
Let
∆˜ =
1− βn+ π/(1 + id)
1/R− nβ . (22)
Then we have the following
11If the borrowing constraint is non-binding (λ` = 0), equation (15) reduces to Vb = βR implying
from (5) that b = 0 since we have βR < 1. Consequently, in any equilibrium where agents hold
collateral it must be the case that the constraint is binding (λ` > 0) and so ` = ¯`= Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i)
¤
implying ∂`∂b = R/
£
φ+1 (1 + i)
¤
.
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Proposition 1 For any (i`, id) with i` ≥ id ≥ 0 there exists a unique symmetric
stationary equilibrium such that
z` > 0 and zm = 0 if and only if ∆ = 1
z` > 0 and zm > 0 if and only if 1 < ∆ < ∆˜
z` = 0 and zm > 0 if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆˜.
Several points are worth mentioning. First, the critical element to verify in the
proof is under which condition agents acquire collateral. They are willing to borrow at
the standing facility if the borrowing rate is not too high, i.e., if ∆ < ∆˜. Second, the
critical value ∆˜ is increasing in R and π, and so is b. Agents increase their collateral
holdings and hence finance a larger share of their consumption by borrowing if R
or π are increased. Third, if ∆ = 1 agents are not willing to hold money across
periods. They just use collateral to borrow money to finance their consumption.
This however does not mean that money is not used since it still plays the role of a
medium of exchange in market 3. It only means that agents do not want to hold it
across periods.
Given a real allocation (q (∆) , b (∆)) any pair (i`, id) satisfying ∆ = 1+i`1+id is con-
sistent with this allocation. Thus, there are many ways to implement a given policy
∆. The allocations only diﬀer in the rate of inflation. This can be seen from (19)
which can be written as follows
γ − π
1 + id
= 1− (1− n)(∆− 1) z`
zm
Since the right-hand side is a constant for a given∆ the inflation rate γ−1 is increasing
in id.
In the introduction we have seen that the ECB (see Figure 1) reacts to changing
economic condition by shifting the interest rate corridor δ = i`− id. An upwards shift
of δ increases ∆ and so reduces aggregate output q and borrowing z`. Another way
to tighten monetary policy is by increasing δ since this also reduces q and b.
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3.5 Optimal policy
We now derive the optimal policy. The central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected lifetime utility of the representative agent. It does so by choosing lump
sum transfers π, consumption q and collateral holding b to maximize (2) subject to
constraint that its choice is consistent with the allocation given by (17)-(20). Given
π, the policy is implemented by choosing ∆.
Assume first that it is optimal to set ∆ ≥ ∆˜. In this case no agent is borrowing
at the standing facility which implies that b = 0. Moreover, from (18) and (19) q
satisfies
q˜(π) = u0−1
µ
1− βn+ π/(1 + id)
β(1− n)
¶
.
Note that q˜ is decreasing in π and that any∆ ≥ ∆˜ implements the same real allocation
(b, q) = (0, q˜).
Now consider the largest q that the central bank can implement. From (17) the
largest q is attained when ∆ = 1. It satisfies
qˆ = u0−1
∙
1/ (βR)− n
1− n
¸
.
Thus, the policy ∆ = 1 attains the allocation (b, q) = (qˆ/ (βR) , qˆ) since no agent
is holding money across period when ∆ = 1. Accordingly, the central bank is con-
strained to choose quantities q such that qˆ ≥ q ≥ q˜(π).
Finally, it can be shown (see the proof of Proposition 1) that when 1 ≤ ∆ < ∆˜, b
and q solve
1− βR
βR
= (1− n) [u0(q)/∆− 1] (23)
q = βRbF (∆;π) (24)
where
F (∆;π) =
1
∆
∙
1 +
(1− n)(∆− 1)
1 + βn(∆− 1)−∆/R+ π/(1 + id)
¸
.
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Thus, the central bank is constrained to choose an allocation that satisfies (23) and
(24) and so the central bank’s maximization problem is
max
q,b,π
(1− n) [u(q)− q] + (βR− 1) b
s.t. q = βRbF
µ
βR(1− n)u0(q)
1− nβR ;π
¶
(25)
and qˆ ≥ q ≥ q˜(π).
where to derive (25) we use (23) to replace ∆ in (24).
Proposition 2 π = 0 is optimal. Also, there exists a critical value R such that if
R < R, then the optimal policy is ∆ ≥ ∆˜. Otherwise the optimal policy is ∆ ∈
³
1, ∆˜
´
.
The striking result of Proposition 2 is that it is never optimal to set a zero interest
rate band δ = i`− id since the optimal interest rate band satisfies ∆ > 1. The reason
is that for society the use of collateral is costly since βR− 1 is negative. The benefit
is that it increases consumption above q = q˜. The central bank thus faces a trade-oﬀ.
It can encourage the use of costly collateral to increase consumption. The optimal
policy simply equates the marginal benefit of additional consumption to the marginal
cost of holding collateral. It is interesting to note that in contrast to collateral the
use of fiat money is not costly for society since money can be produced without cost.
If R is small (R < R) it is optimal for the central bank to discourage the use of
collateral.12 It does so by implementing an interest rate policy that satisfies ∆ ≥ ∆˜.
In contrast if the rate of return is high it sets ∆ ∈
³
1, ∆˜
´
so that agents finance some
of their consumption through borrowing at the standing facility. An increase in R
reduces the optimal ∆. In the limit as R → 1/β the holding of collateral becomes
costless and we now consider the optimal policy in this limiting case.
12This is similar as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2004) albeit in a very diﬀerent context. They
construct a model where capital competes with fiat money as a medium of exchange. They show
that when the socially eﬃcient stock of capital is low (which is the case when the rate of return is
low) a monetary equilibrium exists that dominates the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare. So in
this case it would be optimal to discourage the use of capital as a medium of exchange.
19
These results are intuitive. The optimal monetary policy trades oﬀ the cost of
holding collateral and the consumption flow from borrowing at the facility. When col-
lateral is costly to hold, the central bank wants to discourage its use. This is achieved
by increasing the cost of transforming collateral into money, that is by increasing the
interest rate corridor. By modifying the liquidity properties of collateral, monetary
policy aﬀects the portfolio decision of agents and as a consequence the real allocation.
Costless collateral Holding collateral is costless when R = 1/β since the cost of
acquiring one unit is equal to the discounted return βR. To avoid indeterminacies
of the equilibrium allocation we consider the limiting allocation when the rate of
return of the collateral satisfies R→ 1/β.13 In this limiting case the critical value is
∆˜ = 1−βnβ−βn > 1 and Proposition 1 continues to hold. We define the allocation that
is attained under the optimal policy as the limiting allocation that is attained when
i` → id. We find the following results.
Proposition 3 With costless collateral, the optimal policy i` → id implements the
first-best allocation q∗. The price level approaches infinity.
The proof of the first part is an immediate consequence of equation (17) which
implies that limβR→1 u0 (q) = ∆. Since the first-best allocation requires that u0 (q) = 1
the result is established.
To understand why the price level approaches infinity under the optimal policy
note that if i` = id > 0, then money is strictly dominated in return by collateral.
The reason is that the collateral can costlessly be transformed into money and so any
consumption level that can be achieved with money can be achieved with collateral
13We consider the limiting allocation since at R = 1/β agents are indiﬀerent of how much collateral
they acquire even if they plan not to use it to obtain goods. If λ` > 0 agents are strictly better oﬀ
by increasing their collateral holdings up to the amount where λ` = 0. However, they are indiﬀerent
between any amount of collateral that yields λ` = 0. In the limiting allocation attained when
R→ 1/β agents acquire the smallest amount consistent with λ` = 0.
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at no additional cost. However, the collateral has the intrinsic return βR = 1 while
the return on money is βγ < 1.
14 Consequently, the demand for money approaches
zero. To encourage agents to hold the stock of money its price must approach zero.
This immediately implies that p→ +∞ and therefore zm =M+1/p→ 0. Only at the
Friedman rule i` = id = 0 the returns are equal and so agents are indiﬀerent between
holding money, collateral or both.
4 Trade in the money market
We now assume that ε > 0. Recall that at the beginning of the money market, agents
receive a signal about the probability that they will become a consumer or a producer
in the third market. With probability σk an agent receives the information that he
will be a seller with probability nk, k = H,L.
We focus on the case where ε = nH−nL is small. This case captures the situation
where agents’ liquidity needs in the money market are not too diﬀerent from each
other and not too diﬀerent from their initial beliefs. Consequently, they are reluctant
to pledge all their collateral or to sell all their money holdings in the money market.
Hence borrowing and lending constraints in the money market are not binding when
ε is small (as shown below). As we will see later in this case the money market rate
and the standing facility in our model closely matches the stylized fact mentioned in
the introduction.
In what follows we look at a representative period t. Also, we assume the central
bank does not make lump-sum transfers (π = 0) since we have shown that this is
optimal.
Settlement We letW (m, b, `, d, y) denote the expected value of entering the settle-
ment stage with m units of money, b collateral, ` loans, d deposits and private credit
y where y > 0 means that the agent has borrowed money in the money market of the
14This follows from (18) together with u0(q) = ∆.
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previous period. Z(m, b) denotes the expected value from entering the money market
with m units of money and b collateral.
In the first market, the problem of a representative agent is:
W (m, b,`, d, y) = max
h,m2,b2
−h+ Z (m2, b2)
s.t. φm2 + b2 = h+ φm+Rb+ φ(1 + id)d− φ(1 + i`)`− φ(1 + im)y.
where h is hours worked in market 1. The first-order conditions are
Zm = φ (26)
Zb ≤ 1 ( = if b > 0 ) (27)
Zm ≡ ∂Z(m2,b2)∂m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money and
Zb ≡ ∂Z(m2,b2)∂b2 is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the money
market in period t. The envelope conditions are (6) and
Wy = −φ (1 + im) (28)
where Wy is the partial derivative of W (m, b,`, d, y) with respect to y.
Money market Let yk be the amount of money acquired in the money market.
An agent who has m money and b collateral at the opening of market 2 has expected
lifetime utility
Z(m, b) =
X
k=H,L
σkV k(m+ yk, b, yk)
where yk solves
max
yk
V k(m+ yk, b, yk) s.t. yk ≤ Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + im)
¤
and m+ yk ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions are
V km + V
k
y − φ+1βλkm` + φ+1βλkmd = 0 (29)
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where φ+1βλ
k
m` is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint in the money market
and φ+1βλ
k
md is the one on the lending constraint. Note that since in any equilibrium
those agents who are likely to become sellers do not borrow money and those who
are likely to become buyers do not lend money we have λHm` = 0 and λ
L
md = 0 so that
from (29)
V Hm + V
H
y + φ+1βλ
H
md = 0 (30)
V Lm + V
L
y − φ+1βλLm` = 0 (31)
The marginal value of collateral is Zb(m, b) =
P
k=H,L σ
k
£
V kb + σ
kβRλkm`/ (1 + im)
¤
.
Then (31) gives us
Zb(m, b) =
X
k=H,L
σkV kb + σ
LβR
¡
V Lm + V
L
y
¢
βφ+1 (1 + im)
(32)
since in any equilibrium λLmd = λ
H
m` = 0.
The marginal value of money is Zm(m, b) =
P
k=H,L σ
k
¡
V km + σkβφ+1λ
k
md
¢
. Then
from (30) we have
Zm(m, b) = σLV Lm − σHV Hy . (33)
Thus, the marginal value of money at the beginning of the money market is equal
to the expected value of using the money to buy goods in market 3, σLV Lm , plus the
expected value of lending it in the money market, −σHV Hy .
Finally, the market clearing condition isX
k=H,L
σkyk = 0. (34)
Goods market At the beginning of market 3, an agent’s state is revealed. Consider
an agent of type k who received the signal that he will be a buyer with probability
1 − nk and a producer with probability nk. Let qk and qks respectively denote the
quantities consumed as a consumer and produced as a producer in market 3. Let `kb
(`ks) and d
k
b (d
k
s) respectively denote the loan obtained from the central bank and the
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amount of money deposited at the central bank by this agent in this market. If this
agent holds m money, b collateral and private debt y at the opening of this market
he has expected lifetime utility
V k(m, b, y) = (1− nk)[u(qk) + βW (m− pqk + `k, b, `k, 0, y)]
+nk[−qks + βW (m+ pqks − dk, b, 0, dk, y)]
where qk, qks , `
k
s , `
k
b , d
k
s and d
k
b are chosen optimally as described in Section 3. The
only diﬀerence is that the constraints in the goods market now take into account an
agent’s borrowing or lending yk in the money market as follows
`k ≤ ¯`k ≡ Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i`)
¤
− yk/∆ˆ (35)
pqk ≤ m+ `k (36)
dk ≤ m (37)
where ∆ˆ = 1+i`
1+im
. Note that in equilibrium m = M + yk. The quantity ¯`k is still the
maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the central bank. If the agent has
borrowed money
¡
yk > 0
¢
, the maximal loan size is reduced by yk (1 + im) / (1 + i`).
In contrast, if the agent has lent money
¡
yk < 0
¢
, it is increased accordingly.
Finally, using the fact that λk` = u0(qk) (1 + id)− (1 + i`), λkq = λk` + i` and λkd = id
the marginal value of money, the marginal value of collateral and the marginal value
of private debt in market 3 can be written as follows
V km = βφ+1 (1 + id)
©
1 + (1− nk)
£
u0(qk)− 1
¤ª
(38)
V kb = βR
©
1 +
¡
1− nk
¢ £
u0(qk)/∆− 1
¤ª
(39)
V ky = −βφ+1 (1 + im)
©
1 + (1− nk)
£
u0(qk)/∆− 1
¤ª
. (40)
Endogenous money supply Finally, we need to adjust equation (1) to take into
account how the money market aﬀects the evolution of the stock of money across
periods. The new equation is
M+1 =M −
£
σH
¡
1− nH
¢
`H + σL
¡
1− nL
¢
`L
¤
i` +
£
σHnHdH + σLnLdL
¤
id (41)
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where `k = Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i`)
¤
− yk/∆ˆ and dk = M + yk + pqks . Using the market
clearing conditions in the good and money market we can write this equation as
follows
M+1/M = 1 + id − (i` − id) [σL(1− nL)`L/M + σH(1− nH)`H/M ]. (42)
It is interesting to compare (42) with (19) (when π = 0). As before the entire
stock of money earns interest id. The only diﬀerence is the amount of loans that
the central bank provides. Without money market the amount is (1− n) `/M with a
money market it is [σL(1− nL)`L/M + σH(1− nH)`H/M ].
4.1 Symmetric stationary equilibrium
We again focus on stationary equilibria which requires that M+1/M = φ/φ+1 = γ.
Use equations (9), (32), (38)-(40) and rearrange to write the first-order condition (5)
as follows
1−βR
βR = σ
H
¡
1− nH
¢ £
u0(qH)/∆− 1
¤
+ σL ∆ˆ∆
n
∆ˆ−∆
∆ˆ
+ (1− nL)
£
u0(qL)− 1
¤o
. (43)
Use (9), (33), (38)-(40) and rearrange to write the first-order condition (4) as follows
γ−β(1+id)
β(1+id)
= σL(1− nL)
£
u0(qL)− 1
¤
+ σH ∆
∆ˆ
n
∆−∆ˆ
∆ + (1− nH)
£
u0(qH)/∆− 1
¤o
.
(44)
Then combine (43) with (44) to get the Fisher equation
Rγ = 1 + im. (45)
By defining r ≡ R − 1 and π ≡ γ − 1 we get the standard expression for the Fisher
equation (1 + r) (1 + π) = 1 + im. It is interesting to note that the nominal interest
rate of the Fisher equation is the money market rate im and not the interest rates
from the standing facilities.
In any equilibrium the budget constraints hold with equality and so
pqk = mk + `k =M + yk + `k, k = H,L. (46)
25
Use (46) to substitute yH and yL in the money market’s market clearing condition
(34) and rearrange to get
σHqH + σLqL = zm +
βRb
∆
. (47)
We can combine (34) with (46) to get the real amount of balances acquired (zL) or
sold (zH) on the money market
zH = −σL
¡
qL − qH
¢Ã ∆ˆ
∆ˆ− 1
!
= − σ
L
σH
zL. (48)
Finally, we need to get an expression for the real stock of money. To derive zm use
the Fisher equation (45) to write (42) as follows
R∆ˆ−∆
R∆ˆ (∆− 1)
= σL(1− nL)`L/M + σH(1− nH)`H/M ].
Then, use (46) to substitute `H and `L and rearrange to get
R∆ˆ−∆
R∆ˆ(∆−1) = − (1− n) +
1
zm
£
σL(1− nL)qL + σH(1− nH)qH − σL(nH − nL)zL
¤
.
Finally use (48) and solve for zm to get
zm =
³
∆ˆ
∆ˆ−1
´ {(∆ˆ−1)[σL(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−(nH−nL)σLσH(qL−qH)∆ˆ}R(∆−1)
R∆ˆ−∆+(1−n)R∆ˆ(∆−1) .
(49)
Note that equations (43) - (49) must hold in any equilibrium. We now consider
the case where no short-selling constraint is binding in the money market.
When no short-selling constraint is binding in the money market λHmd = λ
L
m` = 0
and so from (29) V Lm + V
L
y = V
H
m + V
H
y = 0. Then, (38) and (40) imply
u0(qk) =
nk
1− nk
(∆− ∆ˆ)
(∆ˆ− 1)
, k = H,L.
Using these expressions to substitute u0(qH) and u0(qL) in (43) and solving for ∆ˆ
yields
∆ˆ =
∆
nβR (1−∆) +∆ . (50)
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Substitute ∆ˆ back in the above equations to get the quantities
u0(qk) =
nk
1− nk∆
1− nβR
nβR
, k = H,L. (51)
Definition 2 A symmetric stationary equilibrium where no short-selling constraint
is binding in the money market is a time-invariant list
³
∆ˆ, qL, qH , zL, zH , zm, b, γ
´
satisfying (45) - (51) with b ≥ 0, zL < βRb∆ˆ/∆ and zH > −zm.
Then we have the following:
Proposition 4 For any 1 < ∆ < ∆˜ there exists a critical value ε1 > 0 defined
in the proof such that if ε < ε1 a symmetric monetary equilibrium exists where no
short-selling constraint in the money market binds.
Note first that the system of equations (45) - (51) can be solved recursively. Equa-
tions (50) and (51) yield ∆ˆ, qL and qH . Using these values we can then derive¡
zL, zH , zm, b, γ
¢
from the remaining equations. One then has to check that the re-
quired inequalities hold. The inequality b ≥ 0 simply requires that policy is such
that agents have an incentive to acquire collateral which is satisfied whenever ∆ < ∆˜
(defined by (22)). The inequality zL < βRb∆ˆ/∆ requires that those agents who are
likely to become buyers are not pledging all their collateral to acquire money in the
money market and the inequality zH > −zm requires that those agents who are likely
to become sellers are not selling all their money.
4.2 Policy implications
The following policy implications emerge from the model. First, the money market
rate im changes proportionally to a shift of the interest rate corridor. To see this we
can write (50) as follows
im = i` − nβRδ
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where δ = i` − id is the spread of the interest rate corridor. Obviously, im increases
in i` one for one when δ is kept constant. Thus, a shift of the corridor by 50 basis
points will increase the money market rate by 50 basis points.
Second, assume that nβR = 1/2. For example assume n = 1/2 and βR→ 1. The
first assumption means that one half of the agents are borrowing and the other half
are providing cash in the money market. The second assumption means that holding
collateral has no cost. Then, when nβR = 1/2 the money market rate is im = i`+id2 .
That is the money market rate lies exactly on the target (or policy) interest rate.
Therefore, the first and the second features of our model exactly match the behavior
of the overnight money market rate of the channel system operated by the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand. This can be seen from Figure 2 in the introduction. Our model
suggests that the reason for this is that the short-selling constraints of the private
banks in New Zealand are most of the time not binding and that holding collateral
is not very costly, i.e., βR→ 1.
Third, as mentioned in the introduction, the Euro money market rate tends to be
above the target rate. Our model has a simple explanation for this observation. With
n = 1/2 and βR < 1 we have im =
i`(2−βR)+idβR
2
> i`+id
2
. Thus, when it is costly to
hold collateral the money market rate tends to be above the target rate.
Fourth, aggregate consumption is decreasing in∆ since qH and qL are decreasing in
∆. It is also decreasing when the central bank shifts the interest rate corridor upwards
because such a shift increases ∆. Thus the model is consistent with the notion that
the central bank is tightening its policy when it shifts the corridor upwards (holding
everything else constant).
Fifth, from the Fisher equation γ = 1+im
R
, the growth rate of the money supply
is increasing in i` since im is increasing in i`. In contrast, an increase in id, holding
everything else constant, decreases the rate of inflation.
Finally, a central bank can tighten its policy without changing its target rate by
simply increasing the corridor symmetrically around the target rate. This makes it
more costly for banks to access the standing facilities and therefore it is tightening a
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central bank’s policy regime.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the theoretical properties of a channel system of interest rate control
in a dynamic general equilibrium model with infinitely-lived agents and a central
bank. With this model we could match the stylized facts regarding the use of channel
systems by central banks. First, all central banks set a strictly positive corridor.
Second, central banks typically react to changing economic conditions by shifting the
interest-rate corridor. Third, the money market rate tends to be in the middle or
above the middle of the corridor. We have also shed light on the role of collateral and
the link between the corridor and the conditions prevailing in the money market.
While our paper is a first step towards analyzing monetary policy implementation
in a channel system, many aspects have remained unexplored. In particular, optimal
monetary policy in a channel system under stress and aggregate shocks are left for
future research.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 Background15
To understand some of the features of our environment it is useful to have some
information on how the money market functions and on monetary policy procedures
at central banks that operate a standing facility. This section does not aim at being
general and we will therefore concentrate on the case of the euro money markets and
the ECB’s operating procedures.
Operating procedures of the ECB The ECB has two main instruments for the
implementation of its monetary policy. First, it conducts weekly main refinancing
operations that are collateralized loans with a one week maturity. Main refinancing
operations are implemented using a liquidity auction where banks bid for liquidity.
Bids consist of an amount of liquidity and an interest rate. The total amount to be
allocated is announced before the auction. Following the auction, the ECB allocates
liquidity according to the bided rates, in a descending order. The minimum bid rate
is the main policy rate used by the ECB to implement monetary policy.
Second, the ECB oﬀers a standing facility with a lending rate that is 100 basis
points higher than its minimum bid rate and a deposit rate, which is 100 basis points
below its minimum bid rate. At the lending facility, liquidity is provided either in the
form of overnight repurchase agreements or as overnight collateralized loans whereby
the ownership of the asset is retained by the debtor. In both case, banks have to
resort to safe eligible assets as defined by the ECB. Eligible banks can access the
standing facilities at any time of the day. The use of the standing facility largely
depends on banks’ activities on the euro money markets during the day.
15This section draws heavily on materials from ECB (2005), ECB (2004), BIS (2003) and Hart-
mann, Manna and Manzanares (2001).
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The euro money markets There are two segments for the euro money market.
The first segment is the unsecured money market, where banks borrow and lend
cash to each other without resorting to collateral. The reference interest rate on the
unsecured money market is the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) calculated
by the ECB. The second segment is the secured money market where agents lend
at diﬀerent maturities against collateral. This is the largest money market segment.
There are several reference interest rates depending on maturities (Euro interbank
oﬀered rates, or Euribors) and whether the collateral pledged belong to a general
collateral pool (Euripo).
Transactions on both segments of the money market are settled using the two
large-value payment systems operating in the euro area, the Trans-European Auto-
mated Real-Time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and Euro1.
These large value payment systems are essential in finalizing the transfer of funds
for transactions taking place in money markets. Therefore, the opening and closing
hours of money markets are closely related to the operating hours of these payment
systems.
TARGET settles payments with immediate finality in central bank money and
operates between 7am and 6pm C.E.T. with a cut-oﬀ time of 5pm for customer
payments.16 Eligible institutions hold accounts at TARGET, which are debited or
credited depending on market participants’ orders. Intraday credit is provided free
of charge as long as it is fully collateralized. Banks may also access the deposit or
lending facilities after making a request at the latest 30 minutes after the actual
closing time of TARGET.17 After the close of TARGET, an overdraft position on a
bank’s TARGET account is automatically transformed into an overnight loan via a
recourse to the lending facility, again against eligible assets.
Euro1 is a private large-value payment systems oﬀered by the Euro Banking As-
16The unsecured segment opens around 8am in the morning and closes around 5:45pm.
17On the last Eurosystem business day of a minimum reserve maintenance period, the deposit
facility can be accessed for 60 minutes after the actual closing of TARGET.
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sociation (EBA). Euro1 functions as a sort of netting system, whereby on each set-
tlement day, at any given time, each participant will have only one single payment
obligation or claim with respect to the community of other participant as joint cred-
itors/debtors. In particular, there is no bilateral payments, claims or obligations
between participants. Euro1 settles in central bank money at the ECB at the end of
the day. After the cut-oﬀ time of 4pm C.E.T., clearing banks with debit positions
will pay their single obligations into the EBA settlement account at the ECB through
TARGET. After all amounts due have been received, the ECB will pay the clearing
banks with credit positions also through TARGET.
In this paper, we will model two specific features of the description above. First,
banks cannot carry overnight overdrafts on their TARGET accounts, and they have
to borrow either on the money markets or at the lending facility in order to cover their
TARGET positions. When TARGET closes, euro money markets are also closed. As
a consequence, the central bank standing facility is, at the end of the day, the only
recourse to overnight liquidity. Also, since participants can access the standing facility
30 minutes after the close of target, any late payments received on a TARGET account
can be deposited at the standing facility of the ECB. In the first part of the paper we
model this aspect of the liquidity management problem. Second, banks can predict
when a payment is due or incoming so that with a well functioning money market, the
likelihood to resort to the standing facilities should be small. However, there may be
unexpected payments to be made that can force banks to hold an overdraft on their
TARGET account. In the second part of the paper, we adjunct a money market to
the model. There, banks will be able to trade their liquidity when they are confident
that they will end up the day with a credit on their central bank account. Given it
is the most important segment of the money market, we concentrate on the secured
interbank money market. At this stage we will abstract from modelling liquidity
injections in an interbank market.
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6.2 Welfare
In this Appendix we show that if the central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected discounted utility of the representative agent, the central banks objective
is to maximize (2). To derive (2) we must first calculate hours worked in market 1.
The money holdings at the opening of the first market are m˜ = 0 having bought and
m˜ = m+ pqs having sold. Hence, hours worked are
hb = φ[m+1 + (1 + i`)`]− (R− 1)b− πM
hs = φ[m+1 − (1 + id)(m+ pqs)]− (R− 1)b− πM
Since h = nhs + (1− n)hb, by using (1) and rearranging we get
h = −(R− 1)b+ (1− n)φ`− nφ(m+ pqs) + φm
= −(R− 1)b+ (1− n)φ`+ (1− n)φm− nφpqs
= −(R− 1)b.
since pq = m+ ` and qs = 1−nn q. Then, welfare is given by
W = −b+ (1− n) [u (q)− q] +
∞X
j=1
βj {(1− n) [u (q)− q] + (R− 1) b}
=
(1− n)[u(q)− q] + (βR− 1)b
1− β
6.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For ease of exposition we assume π = 0. The proof can
be easily replicated when π > 0. We first prove the only if part. Assume first z` = 0
and zm > 0. Then from (18) and (19) we get
1− β
β
= (1− n) [u0(q)− 1] . (52)
and from (17) we have
1−Rβ
Rβ
≥ (1− n) [u0(q)/∆− 1] . (53)
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Use (53) to replace u0(q) in (52) and rearrange to get ∆ ≥ ∆˜.
Assume now that z` > 0 and zm > 0. Then from (19) z` > 0 implies that 1+id > γ.
Use (18) to replace γ and rearrange to get ∆ < ∆˜. Next divide (19) by 1 + id and
solve for ∆ to get
∆ = 1 +
zm
z`
1 + id − γ
(1− n) (1 + id)
> 1
since 1 + id > γ. Hence we have 1 < ∆ < ∆˜ if z` > 0 and zm > 0.
Finally, assume that z` > 0 and zm = 0. Then, the previous equation immediately
implies that ∆ = 1.
We now prove the if part. From (18) and (19) we get
1− nβ − β (1− n)u0(q) = (1− n) (∆− 1) z`
zm
. (54)
and from (17) we have
∆
µ
1
R
− nβ
¶
≥ β (1− n)u0(q) (55)
Assume first that 1 < ∆ < ∆˜. Use (54) to rewrite (55) as follows
1− nβ −∆
µ
1
R
− nβ
¶
≤ (1− n) (∆− 1) z`
zm
.
Rearrange to get
0 < ∆˜−∆ ≤ (1− n) (∆− 1)
(1/R− nβ)
z`
zm
.
Hence, 1 < ∆ < ∆˜ implies z`
zm
> 0.
Assume next that ∆ ≥ ∆˜. Then from (54) we have
1− nβ − β (1− n)u0(q) ≥ (1− n)
³
∆˜− 1
´ z`
zm
.
Then z` > 0 immediately implies that
0 > ∆˜−∆ ≥
(1− n)
³
∆˜− 1
´
(1/R− nβ)
z`
zm
.
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a contradiction. Hence ∆ ≥ ∆˜ implies z` = 0.
Existence and uniqueness when ∆˜ ≤ ∆: In this case z` = b = 0 and from
(19) γ = 1 + id. Then, from (18) and (19) we get (52). Since right-hand side of (52)
is strictly decreasing in q there exists a unique q that solves (52). Finally, from (20)
we have zm = q.
Existence and uniqueness when 1 < ∆ < ∆˜: The system of equations (17)-
(20) with z` = βRb/∆ can be reduced as follows. Equations (20) and z` = βRb/∆
imply zm = q − βRb/∆. Then, multiply both sides of (19) by zm and replace zm to
get
(q − βRb/∆) [γ − (1 + id)] = −(1− n)z`(i` − id)
Use (18) to eliminate γ and rearrange to get
(q − βRb/∆) {1− (1− n)β[u0(q)− 1]− β} = (1− n) βRb
(1 + i`)
(i` − id)
Hence, an equilibrium is defined by the following two equations:
1
Rβ
= (1− n)u0(q)/∆+ n
(q − βRb/∆) {1− (1− n)β[u0(q)− 1]− β} = (1− n) βRb
(1 + i`)
(i` − id)
We can use the first equation to replace for u0(q) in the second to get
1
Rβ
= (1− n)u0(q)/∆+ n
q = βRbF (∆)
If we substitute q in the first expression, we get
1
Rβ
= (1− n)u0 [βRbF (∆)] /∆+ n ≡ RHS (56)
The left-hand side of (56) is constant while the right-hand side is decreasing in b for
a given 1 ≤ ∆ < ∆˜. Moreover, we have limb→0RHS = +∞ and limb→∞RHS = n <
1
Rβ . Hence, for any policy ∆ with 1 ≤ ∆ < ∆˜ a unique b > 0 exists. Then, from (24)
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a unique value for q exists. Accordingly a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium
exist.
Finally, we have lim∆→∆˜ F (∆) = +∞ and so b→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that π = 0 is optimal. Note that qˆ is
independent of π and q˜ is decreasing in π. Therefore, increasing π does not improve
the set of attainable allocations. Second, F (∆;π) is decreasing in π, so that given q,
i` and id, increasing π would increase b and therefore would reduce welfare. Hence,
since π ≥ 0, it is optimal to set π to zero.
We now assume π = 0. Substituting (25) into the objective function the problem
becomes
max
q
(1− n) [u(q)− q] + (βR− 1) q
βRF
³
Rβ(1−n)u0(q)
1−nRβ
´
s.t. qˆ ≥ q ≥ q˜.
After rearranging, the first-order condition is
(1− n) [u0(q)− 1] + 1− βR
βRF (∆)
∙
F 0 (∆)∆
F (∆)
u00 (q) q
u0 (q)
− 1
¸
= λˆ− λ˜
where λˆ is the multiplier of the first inequality and λ˜ the one of the second inequality.
Consider the first-order condition and note that
∆ (q) =
Rβ (1− n)u0 (q)
1− nRβ .
Suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ = 1, i.e., q = qˆ. In this case λ˜ = 0 and
λˆ > 0 implying that Θ (qˆ, R) > 0. Then we have F (1) = 1, F 0 (1) = 1−nR
R−1 and so
Θ (qˆ, R) =
1− βR
βR
1− nR
R− 1
u00 (qˆ) qˆ
u0 (qˆ)
< 0
which is a contradiction. Thus, in any equilibrium q < qˆ implying ∆ > 1.
Now suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ = ∆˜, i.e., q = q˜. In this case
λ˜ > 0 and λˆ = 0 implying that Θ (q˜, R) < 0. One can show that lim∆→∆˜ F (∆) =∞,
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lim∆→∆˜ F
0 (∆) = ∞, lim∆→∆˜
F 0(∆)∆
F (∆) = ∞ and lim∆→∆˜
F 0(∆)∆
F (∆)F (∆) =
(1−1/R)
(1/∆)2(1−n)(∆−1)2 .
Moreover, (1− n) [u0(q)− 1] = 1/β − 1. Accordingly, we get
Θ (q˜, R) = 1/β − 1 + 1− βR
βR
R (1− βn)2
(R− 1) (1− n)
u00 (q˜) q˜
u0 (q˜)
Consider first R→ 1. Then we have limR→1Θ (q˜, R) = −∞. Now consider R→ 1/β.
Then we have limR→1/β Θ (q˜, R) = 1/β−1 > 0. Since 1−βRβ
(1−βn)2
(R−1)(1−n) is monotonically
decreasing in R we have a unique critical value R such that Θ
¡
q˜, R
¢
= 0. Thus if
R < R, q = q˜ and if R > R, q solves Θ (q,R) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The first thing to note is that the system of equations
(45) - (51) can be solved recursively as described in the text. It remains to show under
which conditions the short selling constraints in the money market are nonbinding.
Thus, we need to verify that yk < Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + im)
¤
and that m + yk > 0. Using
the seller’s first-order condition and dividing by p we can write these conditions as
follows
zk < βRb∆ˆ/∆ and zm + zk > 0
Since zL > zH it is suﬃcient to check that zL < βRb∆ˆ/∆. Along the same line, since
zL > zH it is suﬃcient to check that zH > −zm.
Let us first consider whether zH > −zm. From (48) and (49) zH > −zm if
σL
¡
qL − qH
¢
<
(∆ˆ−1)[σL(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−σLσH(qL−qH)(nH−nL)∆ˆ
Φ
where Φ =
³
R∆ˆ−∆
´
/ [R (∆− 1)] + (1− n) ∆ˆ. Note that Φ > (1− n) ∆ˆ since
R∆ˆ > ∆.
Then nH − nL = ε and σLnL+ σHnH = n yield nH = n+ σLε and nL = n− σHε.
Using these relations and rearranging yields
qL − qH < (
∆ˆ−1)(1−n)
³
σH
σL
qH+qL
´
−εσH(qL−qH)
Φ
Divide by qH and rearrange to get
qL
qH
h
Φ−
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
(1− n) + εσH
i
< Φ+ σ
H
σL
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
(1− n) + εσH
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The left-hand side is larger than zero since Φ > (1− n) ∆ˆ. Moreover, it is strictly
smaller than the right-hand side at ε = 0 (since qL = qH at ε = 0). Then, divide the
inequality by
h
Φ− (1− n)
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
+ σHε
i
to get
qL
qH
<
Φ+ σ
H
σL
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
(1− n) + σHε
Φ−
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
(1− n) + σHε
The left hand side is increasing in ε and the right-hand side is decreasing. Therefore
there is a unique ε˜1 such that zH > −zm when ε < ε˜1.
We next check βRb∆ˆ/∆ > zL. From σHqH + σLqL = zm + βRb∆ we need σ
HqH +
σLqL > zm + zL/∆ˆ, or replacing for zm and zL, and rearranging we need
σHqH + σLqL >
∆ˆ{(∆ˆ−1)[σL(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−(nH−nL)σLσH(qL−qH)∆ˆ}
(∆ˆ−1)Φ
+
σH(qL−qH)
(∆ˆ−1)
Multiply through by
³
∆ˆ− 1
´
and arrange to obtain
¡
σHqH + σLqL
¢
∆ˆ− qL > ∆ˆ{(∆ˆ−1)[σ
L(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−(nH−nL)σLσH(qL−qH)∆ˆ}
Φ
Use nH = n+ σLε and nL = n− σHε to substitute nH and nL and rearrange to getµ
σHqH + σLqL − q
L
∆ˆ
¶
Φ > (1− n)
¡
σLqL + σHqH
¢ ³
∆ˆ− 1
´
− σLσH
¡
qL − qH
¢
ε
This expression is satisfied at ε = 0 since we have Φ > (1−n)∆ˆ. Dividing both sides
by σHqH + σLqL, and rearranging gives
Φ
∆ˆ
³
σH q
H
qL
+σL
´ < Φ− ³∆ˆ− 1´ (1− n) + σLσHεµ1− qHqL ¶
σH q
H
qL
+σL
Since q
H
qL
is decreasing in ε, the left-hand side is increasing in ε and the right-hand
side is also increasing in ε. Therefore, given this constraint does not bind at ε = 0,
either it never binds or it binds for some ε > ε´1. Thus, if ε < ε1 = min{ε˜1,ε´1} a
unique equilibrium exists where no short-selling constraint binds.
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